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Online interactions are often based on trust, the sharing of information and a degree of inter-
dependence, as found with many offline relationships. The recent events at companies such as 
TalkTalk and Ashley Madison are the latest in a series of high profile cybersecurity incidents that 
demonstrate what happens when this trust relationship is breached. Despite the common media 
depiction, incidents of this type may not be the result of the archetypal hacker using technological 
means to hack into a system. Instead cybersecurity attacks are increasingly based primarily on social 
engineering techniques, which refers to the use of psychological manipulation to trick people into 
disclosing sensitive information or inappropriately granting access to a secure system (Tetri & 
Vuorinen, 2013). One of the more well-known examples of social engineering that many of us will 
have encountered would be phishing emails, which attempt to fool the recipient into opening a link 
or attachment that will install malicious software onto their computer. These phishing emails draw 
upon many of principles of social psychology, consumer psychology and behaviour change by, for 
example, using a fear appeal or invoking a sense of scarcity or urgency if the recipient does not act 
quickly. These phishing emails may only be successful a fraction of the time, but with the ability to 
send out tens of thousands of emails at once, at no or zero cost to the sender, this can still be a 
productive means of gaining access to individuals’ computers.  Yet despite the intrinsically 
psychological nature of many cybersecurity attacks, research into the role of psychology in 
cybersecurity is still limited. Indeed, even research into social engineering is often conducted from 
the discipline of computing rather than social psychology.  
 
The motivations of online adversaries are varied, from financial gain to acts of political and 
ideological protest or even just personal amusement. Large scale cybersecurity incidents appear to 
have one factor in common however, which is that they are often instigated by groups, as opposed 
to individuals acting alone. As such these incidents can be regarded as the result of group actions 
and group processes, although applying traditional concepts of group structures to the online world 
is problematic. For example, Anonymous, one of the more publically known hacktivist groups, is not 
a close cohesive group that works in cooperation, but an umbrella term for those who identify with 
the aims of a section. Both Lulzsec and Lizard Squad were distinct groups that evolved from the 
loose collective of Anonymous, each with their own profile and characteristics. It has been alleged 
that in some instances individuals have been coerced or manipulated into participating in online 
activities by members of these groups without an accurate understanding of the consequence of 
their actions or the risk of criminalisation (Olson, 2012). Tools and software that can be used to aide 
an individual with limited technological knowledge to hack into systems are increasingly available on 
the internet; as such barriers to participation in cybercrime and hacktivism are falling. Such 
individuals may be referred to as script kiddies, which is a label that is both used by the script kiddies 
themselves and as a derogatory term by those who see themselves as real hackers.  An example of 
this type of software would be the LOIC software shared amongst users of the internet image board 
website 4chan. Named after a weapon called a low orbit ion canon in the video game Command and 
Conquer this open source software can be used to participate in a distributed denial of service 
(DDoS) attack which overloads a website and takes it offline. This software has been used in a 
number of group hacktivism campaigns, including one known as Project Chanology, carried out by 
Anonymous, in which the Church of Scientology was targeted. Instructions on how to download and 
use the software were disseminated to individuals who wished to participate in the campaign, not all 
of whom had a good understanding of the software or the possible risks use of it entailed. Following 
the incident a number of individuals who participated in the campaign were arrested (Olson, 2012).  
 
The majority of psychological research that has been done to date in this area has focussed on 
prevention and mitigation strategies for the targets of cybersecurity incidents. There is little 
understanding of what motivates the adversaries to select the targets in the first place, particularly 
in cases of hacktivism and online protest where adversaries place themselves at risk of prosecution 
for no obvious financial gain. This is in contrast to other areas of psychology and behaviour change. 
In the alcohol field for instance, research and support services have been developed to help those 
affected by heavy drinking, but efforts are also made to understand why people drink heavily and to 
educate them on the possible consequences of doing so. There is the potential for similar 
approaches to be used in relation to participation in cybersecurity incidents. The need for work in 
this area has recently been highlighted by the National Crime Agency, who provide advice on how to 
stop young people from becoming involved in cybercrime (http://tinyurl.com/jqrajq6). In this article 
we discuss the contributions that social psychological research and theory can make to 
cybersecurity, and how individuals may be empowered to make informed decisions about their 
participation in cybersecurity incidents.  
 
For the lulz 
One motivation that is evident in a number of cybersecurity incidents, particularly those targeted at 
individuals, is personal enjoyment, or for the lulz to use the language of some online groups 
(Coleman, 2014). This type of cybersecurity incident is under-researched, but could perhaps be 
informed by some of the studies that have been conducted on cyberbullying and trolling, which refer 
to intentional, aggressive acts carried out repeatedly over time using electronic communication 
(Slonje & Smith, 2008). In many cases it may in fact be difficult to differentiate a cyberbullying 
incident from a cybersecurity incident. As would appear to be the case with a number of 
cybersecurity incidents some perpetrators identify their primary motivation for engaging in cyber 
bullying to simply be because they find it funny (Slonje & Smith, 2008). The influence of anonymity, 
disinhibition and deindividuation may be of particular importance in such incidents. The perception 
of anonymity afforded by online communications allows individuals to take actions that would 
otherwise result in legal or social sanctions, although as noted earlier there may of course be a gap 
between an individual’s understanding of how likely they are to be identified and the actual reality 
of this. Disinhibition on the other hand refers to the sense that actions conducted online do not feel 
as real as those conducted offline – which, it has been argued, can lead individuals to lose self-
control (Mason, 2008). Finally deindividuation may occur, in  which individual lose their sense of self-
awareness when within a group (Reicher, Spears, & Postmes, 1995; Taylor & MacDonald, 2002). 
Again this is an under-researched area, but it would seem that some individuals become engaged 
with online groups to an extent which would seem to be particularly intense.  
 
Hacktivism 
The motivation behind a cyberattack may also relate to political and ideological motivations, which 
in some ways could be considered to be the antithesis of cyberattacks committed for the lulz.  Yet 
there is not necessarily a clear distinction between the different motivations which may drive an 
individual or group to participate in cyber adversarial acts. Whilst Anonymous have been implicated 
in cyberattacks against apparently random targets they have also taken part in actions such as 
providing internet access to protestors in Tunisia during the 2011 uprising, after the Tunisian 
government attempted to block all internet traffic within the country. Cybercrime, cyberterrorism 
and hacktivism may share many of the same outcomes, and as Rogers notes groups may actively 
choose to present themselves as hacktivists rather than cybercriminals or cyberterrorists due to the 
greater social acceptance this will give them (Rogers, 2010). Nevertheless, there would appear to be 
cyberattacks which have a wider political goal, particularly those attacks instigated by groups. 
Alberici et al (2012) argue that the motivations that drive people to collective action include 
identification with a group involved in a conflict; a feeling that the situation of one’s own group is 
unfair and a shared belief that the group can bring about change. Underpinning this there is also 
often a sense that core moral principles have been violated and must be defended and reinstated. 
These motivations would seem to fit with the tendency of hacktivism campaigns to be directed at 
organisations that are perceived to be suppressing the freedom of information. This conflict 
between politically motivated, social justice campaigns and committing cybersecurity attacks for the 
lulz may undermine some groups. In the case of Anonymous it has been suggested that some of the 
splintering and in-fighting within collective arose with from some members feeling that ideologically 
driven campaigns were not consistent with the type of anarchy and random actions by which the 
group had previously defined itself (Olson, 2012).  
 
Impression management and social identity 
A characteristic of hacktivist groups and cyberattackers is the mystery around the identity of their 
members and the actual reach and capabilities of the group. This is of course necessitated in some 
cases so that individuals can avoid being identified by law enforcement agencies, but many of these 
groups have become adept at brand management for the promotion of themselves and their cause. 
Anonymous have become particularly known for the Guy Fawkes mask, taken from a graphic novel 
on which the film V for Vendetta was based on. This symbol has become co-opted and replicated 
across many groups and used as a way of expressing discontent with the Establishment. This type of 
sophisticated marketing and self-promotion is at odds with what could be considered the stereotype 
as a computer hacker. Rogers argues that such stereotypes of hackers as young, socially awkward 
males have become a substitute for actual research (Rogers, 2010). Individuals may be skilled 
socially when taking part in online communications, even if they are less so in offline situations, and 
these skills are valued within the groups. Online communication does allow for a far greater degree 
of impression management than is the case offline, and it is easy to see why individuals who are less 
socially skilled offline may be drawn towards interacting with others online (Fullwood, 2015).  
 
Groups can also engage in forms of collective impression management. It has been claimed for 
example that Anonymous engaged in impression management by overstating their capabilities to 
journalists (Olson, 2012) who investigated some of the early cybersecurity incidents instigated by the 
group. The use of impression management by such groups may be a factor as to why people are 
drawn towards them. The annual DEF CON hacking convention held every year in Las Vegas is 
attended not only by those who engage in hacking, but also by those who identify with the 
excitement and glamour that they perceive hacking to have, despite have little or no personal 
involvement in actual hacking activities. Their association with groups and individuals who do 
engage in hacktivism and cybercrime may be an example of what Cialdini refers to as basking in 
reflected glory (Cialdini et al., 1976). In order to help prevent future cybersecurity incidents the 
media could also, as argued by Rogers (Rogers, 2010)  take a more responsible approach to the 
reporting of cybercriminals, to avoid glamourizing individuals and setting them up as role models. 
There are also claims via social media accounts, on platforms such as Twitter, that the hype 
surrounding multiple “ops” are a deliberate attempt to undermine the achievements and popularity 
of the hacktivist groups. It has been suggested that by creating many ops on social media, detractors 
of hacktivist groups dilute the power of numbers (which is a large part of Anonymous’ success) and 
then use the “failed ops” as examples of how the hacktivist groups are declining and far less 
influential than they once were.  
 
Group processes 
As previously discussed, many cybersecurity incidents would appear to be orchestrated by groups. 
As is established in social psychology being a member of a group can alter individual behaviour and 
thought processes in a number of fundamental ways. For example, cognitive processes such as 
decision making, planning, judging and problem solving may be undertaken at a group level rather 
than an individual level (Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997). Similarly, emotions can spread throughout 
groups, even to members who were not involved in the original event that prompted the emotion 
(E. R. Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007). This may be particularly relevant to cybersecurity incidents that 
are linked to online social protest and hacktivism, where there is a sense of anger at a perceived 
injustice or suppression of freedom. It has also been found that individuals will make riskier 
decisions when in groups than when alone, even if the decision is made privately after the group 
discussion has taken place (Wallach, Kogan, & Bem, 1962). However, individuals are often unaware 
of the influence that the group is having on their behaviour (Darley, 1992).  
 
As predicted by intergroup attribution research (Hewstone & Jaspars, 1982) the success of group 
actions by hacktivism and other cyber adversarial groups could be expected to strengthen individual 
members’ beliefs that they are highly skilled, and that any successes of opposing groups such as law 
enforcement  are more attributable to external circumstances and luck. This may have emboldened 
the group to take further actions against other organisations, particularly if that group identity is 
reinforced by media reporting. It has been commented that early news reports about Anonymous 
generally overstated both the level of cohesiveness between group members and organisational 
structure of the group (Olson, 2012), an observation which in fact has been a factor in the group 
becoming more cohesive and organised. The cohesiveness of groups however was also affected by 
the shock of the “Sabu-tage” when a high ranking member of Lulzsec was revealed to have been an 
informant for the FBI, leading to the arrests of other prominent group members. There are notable 
changes to the group behaviours since, with increased dislike of what is termed within the group as 
‘leader-fags’, suspicion of new or unknown members, and those who are perceived to be looking for 
attention. 
Empowering informed decision making 
 
Hacktivism and cybercrime have the potential to create ethical conflicts for psychologists and other 
behaviour change experts. Hacktivism campaigns vary in how much impact they have, but often 
include at least some degree of illegality. What is seen as a form of social protest through hacktivism 
in one country may be viewed as a clear case of cybercrime in another  (R. G. Smith, Cheung, & Yiu-
Chang Lau, 2015). As social engineering based attacks become more common and hacktivism groups 
make greater use of social media it is inevitable that psychologists will be increasingly drawn into the 
sphere of cybersecurity. Conflicts will arise between the need to help individuals and organisations 
protect themselves, and the rights of a population to protest against their governments.  
 
Attempts to dissuade people, and especially young adults, from becoming involved in hacktivism and 
cybercrime by instructing them they should not do so, would seem destined to fail. As experienced 
across a range of health and social behaviours, such direct and blatant attempts to change behaviour 
can easily result in a reactance response, in which an individual or group resent the perception that 
their choices are being removed from them. In some cases the individual may adopt an attitude 
directly contrary to that which they feel is being pushed upon them, in a process known as negative 
attitude change (Fuegen & Brehm, 2004). Given that many hacktivism groups define themselves on 
the basis of being anarchistic it would seem especially likely that attempts to bring about behaviour 
change in these groups would result in this type of negative response. It is important to also 
understand the role that being part of these groups has for individuals. If we discourage them from 
interacting with groups associated with hacktivism and cybercrime then we may also be asking them 
to abandon something that is an important basis of their social identity and self-esteem. 
An alternative approach is to aim to empower young people to make more informed decisions about 
their participation in hacktivism and other online activities. By doing this no comment is being made 
to the young people about what they should be doing; instead it just prompts them to consider the 
factors that may be influencing their behaviour and what the consequences of participation may be. 
This does of course have parallels with other areas of behaviour change, where there is a move away 
from using scare tactics and ‘health terrorism’. As discussed above there are a number of group 
processes and biases which young people could be educated about in order to help them develop 
resilience against being misled into participating in actions which could result in their criminalisation. 
Making them aware that they may be misled could trigger a reactance response, which could be a 
protective factor by making them be more critical and sceptical of people they encounter online.  
 
As the internet and digital technologies become increasingly pervasive in our lives it is important 
that psychologists gain a better understanding of hacktivism and cybercrime through engagement 
with people involved in such groups; and take caution in accepting the negative stereotypes as fact. 
Whilst there will always be trolls and those who are only in it for the lulz, their motivations may not 
be as straightforward as first thought. There also appears to be a number of young people involved 
in hacktivism groups who are intelligent, skilled and passionate about social justice. It is better to 
work with such individuals to explore ways of bringing about positive change than to leave them to 
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